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ABSTRACT
BAILED OUT WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM MY FRIENDS:
SOCIAL SIMILARITY AND CURRENCY SWAPS DURING THE 2008 CRISIS
MAY 2017
TIMOTHY E. MARPLE, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS, AMHERST
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS, AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Kevin L. Young
One policy reaction of the Federal Reserve to the 2008 financial crisis was the extension of
currency swap lines to foreign central banks; this constituted the global transfer of billions of US
dollars of wealth and exhibited the role of the US as a global lender of last resorts. Some have
attempted to explain the supply of these lines as a function of risk mitigation for domestic US
banks with foreign holdings, but no one has yet investigated its social dynamics. In recognizing
that the global demand for emergency liquidity was greater than the Federal Reserve’s supply,
this paper investigates how the similarity of foreign central banks affected the selection of banks
to receive liquidity extensions. I calculate similarity scores to the US Federal Reserve for foreign
banks eligible for liquidity extensions during the crisis. These measure the textual similarity of
foreign central bankers’ speeches to those of the Fed, the institutional design similarity to that of
the Fed, and the similarity of foreign central banks’ governors’ educational and professional
backgrounds to those of the 2008 Federal Open Markets Commission members. I find that the
similarity of foreign central banks to the US offers a significantly stronger and statistically more
robust answer to the question of what drove this decision process, and offer implications for
regulatory mechanisms to ameliorate this tendency toward homophily.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
During the outbreak of the 2008 financial crisis, the Federal Reserve became one of the
most consequential institutions on the global stage. The central bank served a well-known role as
lender of last resort for US banks, shoring up their liquidity with highly contentious lending
programs to preclude broader domestic economic collapse. At the same time, a similar but lesserknown program was executed; in a series of currency swap agreements which cumulatively
totaled over $500 billion, the Fed provided foreign banks and central banks with liquidity
necessary to meet their own dollar debt obligations, acting as a global lender of last resort as well
(Broz, 2015). It is difficult to overstate the magnitude of this policy decision; these swaps
totaled more than the entire 2008 US defense spending proposal, the largest discretionary
spending item in the US federal budget that year (2008 Public Budget Database). Importantly,
these swaps were larger than some of the domestic bank loans which ignited mass public
movements like Occupy Wall Street, and others (Broz, 2015).
The anticlimactic response to these swap lines is nearly as striking in academic literature
as it was on the domestic political stage. Only a handful of studies have taken up the issue of
currency swap recipients as a centerpiece of their analyses, and in most cases these have been
confined to the explanation of lending recipient anomalies (Aizenman and Pasricha, 2009), rather
than the structural patterns of global liquidity distribution. The only author to address this
question directly found a relationship between US banking exposure and likelihood of swap
receipt, framing the process as the Fed accommodating elite banking interests (Broz, 2015). In
this study, I offer an alternative theory rooted in the cognitive foundations of human decisionmaking under uncertainty. I suggest that social similarity of foreign central bankers to the
1

members of the Federal Open Market Commission (FOMC), who held the decision-making
power over which states were considered for and ultimately received swap lines, was the most
consequential factor in this process.
While these swap lines constitute a unique case of clandestine policy made under
uncertainty, the theory proposed here is not isolated to monetary or financial phenomena alone.
Many institutions of US government are afforded similar autonomy in making highly
consequential decisions, ranging from the discretion of enforcement actions given to many US
federal agencies, to the appointment of any number of delegated positions within the US
government at large. The logic of this model serves to broaden the lens through which we
understand the actions of autonomous institutions in government and the processes by which
elites make consequential decisions within them. Social similarity as an explanatory model is not
isolated to the field of political economy, but serves to offer depth and nuance in explaining the
case of foreign swap line recipients during the 2008 crisis.
This study introduces novelty in both data and methods for the investigation of the Fed’s
choice of swap recipients during the crisis. I introduce a sampling strategy to identify
counterfactual recipients using propensity score matching based on explicit decision criteria
enunciated in the meeting minutes of the FOMC. I further offer methodological innovation in the
empirical measurement of social similarity, including the employment of corpus comparison
techniques to measure similarity of central bankers’ speeches, the use of global employment
networks to measure social distance of central bankers from FOMC members, and factor analysis
to identify unique dimensions of institutional similarity across central banks. I find that all three
dimensions of similarity are significantly associated with the likelihood of receiving a swap line,
and conclude with implications for global economic management during future financial crises.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
During the financial crisis of 2008, the Federal Open Market Commission held singular
discretion over the distribution of over half a trillion dollars through the vehicle of emergency
currency swap arrangements with foreign central banks (Broz, 2015). Despite the readily
apparent rationale for its investigation, it has received very little attention in the IPE community.
What little scholarship which has broken ground in this field has investigated other
idiosyncrasies of this period, such as which emerging market economies were ushered into the
community of US swap line partners (Aizenman and Pasricha, 2009), and the conditions that led
the US to serve the role of ‘global lender of last resort’ in the first place (McDowell, 2012).
These have provided important insight into the many dyadic relationships which emerged from
the deep liquidity demands left by the crisis, as well as their qualitative changes, but fail to focus
on one of the most critical dimensions of this phenomenon: the determinants of receiving
liquidity from the US when a country needed it.
The only study which takes direct aim at this question highlights the role of domestic
financial banks’ foreign interests in the determination of swap recipients (Broz, 2015). Using
measures of foreign economies’ exposure to US finance, Broz effectively demonstrates the role
of domestic US banks’ future well-being in the FOMC’s decision of swap line recipients. This is
backed with an analysis of those same banks’ contributions to Congressional representatives
during their consideration of a bill which would render the Fed’s lending activities more
transparent. This two-step demonstration constructs a convincing case for the primacy of
domestic capital interests in the provision of emergency liquidity, with findings robust to a
variety of other theoretically relevant economic indicators (Broz, 2015). The findings paint a
3

picture of international finance as solely responsive to the giants of its own industry, with
regulators bending to the will of capital rather than the other way around. The logic is coldly
computational, with sheer interest calculations taking the place of more nuanced decision
processes centered around the individuals who make them.
Despite the attractively intuitive logic of the model, we should not believe that this is the
only, or even the most significant influence on elite decision-making. This logic relies on a series
of strong assumptions about the decision-making processes of FOMC members, not the least of
which is the primary criteria for adjudication. Through the inclusion of solely economic
indicators, this model leaves no causal room for social parameters of decision-making. This is in
apparent conflict with the very decision criteria set forth by the FOMC, which Broz cites,
suggesting the choice of swap recipients in part by their pursuit of ‘prudent policy’ ("Minutes of
the Federal Open Market Committee October 28-29”, 2008). A replication of Broz’ model shows
that, while the exposure to US finance variable is robust to other economic indicators, its
significance is lost alongside institutional and policy-based measures, such as central bank
independence . This is not in conflict with Broz’ conclusions, which suggest that the interests of
domestic finance were significant but not singular influences on the choice of swap recipients.
This does suggest the need for analytical accommodation of a broader variety of potential causal
influences, especially those which relate to more social dimensions. Such an approach has the
potential not only to identify the competition between economic and social determinants, but also
to investigate their interplay in this process.
This logic is consistent with a broad literature on the social dimension of international
financial governance. The role of homophily and social clustering processes in the actions of
financial elites is well-documented in the field of international political economy. Within the US,
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there is evidence to show that social distance from the SEC is significantly associated with the
frequency of firms’ advocacy over proposed legislation (Young et al, 2017), and some have
argued that this dynamic of private-regulatory backscratching constituted the kindling of the
2008 crisis (Baker, 2010; Engelen et al, 2012). Such findings on the influence of social
relationships on regulation have been demonstrated elsewhere internationally, as well, including
in the UK (Grant, 1993) and in northeast Asia (Selmier, 2013). Clearly, social selection is a
consequential feature of the domestic interactions between private and public agents, and holds
strong implications for the decisions of financial regulatory elites across the world.
This dynamic between private and regulatory, however, appears to hold within the
regulatory world itself. There is ample evidence of ‘club-like’ behavior between and among
regulators themselves, in the absence of such relationships with private bankers (Tsingou, 2014).
To a certain degree this should be expected; a vast body of literature on the ‘revolving door’ in
finance has thoroughly established the fuzziness or total absence of boundaries between the
classes of private financial elites and their regulatory counterparts, both within the US (Johnson
2009; Johnson and Kwak 2010; Tett 2009) and internationally (Seabrooke and Tsingou, 2009;
Young and Pagliari 2015). Still, the prevalence of this dynamic between regulators on a global
stage suggests that the institutional contexts in which they work largely fail to mitigate the role
of social selection in the decisions of financial regulatory elites.
These findings strongly suggest that an analysis of financial regulatory elites’ decisions in
isolation of the social dimensions of those decisions is only a partial analysis, at best. Ignoring
this dimension can not only warp the models we build to reflect reality, but can even attribute
false causality to economic indicators as a result of the collinearity with a social confound. For
example, it is quite likely that countries receiving a swap line may have also had strong US bank
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presence, both as a result of that country’s similarity to the US along regulatory and social
dimensions. This paper aims to build an integrated framework of the FOMC’s decision process
in selecting swap line recipients during the financial crisis of 2008. Building on the existing work
by Broz, I build measures of different, theoretically relevant dimensions of social similarity to
the Fed to predict the likelihood of a state receiving a swap line during or after the crisis.
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CHAPTER 3
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
A. Theory
This study aims to build a theory of swap recipient selection premised in social similarity.
Approaching this question from a different dimension than earlier approaches, I suggest that the
cognitive foundations of human decision-making are the primary factors which should be
considered in clandestine, high-stakes policy choices. As such, this study situates its claims
deeply within psychological literature on the heuristics used by individuals to adjudicate
decisions under circumstances of great uncertainty. These micro-foundations are generalized to
the macro-level to clarify the logic by which we would expect FOMC members to select on
criteria of social similarity.
The theory put forth in this paper is premised in cognitive models of decision-making.
The cornerstone of this theory is found in work by Tversky and Kahneman, which documents the
various heuristics and mental shortcuts used by individuals to economize on cognitive processing
when assessing probabilities of some event under uncertainty (1975). These authors review three
key psychological heuristics to handle uncertainty, those of representativeness, availability, and
anchoring and adjustment, and document the biases resulting from their use. The
representativeness heuristic pertains to answering the probabilistic question, ‘How likely is it that
object A belongs to class B?,’ where the availability bias pertains to assessing likelihoods of
some event based on the ease with which that event is imagined by the assessor. Adjustment and
anchoring, collectively, handle the Bayesian updating of likelihood estimates within decisions
based on the presentation of new information. The theory developed here will deal primarily
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with the heuristics of representativeness and availability, for their clear applications to the
assessment of risk in issuing swap lines.
These heuristics’ interplay is the proposed mechanism by which social similarity
influenced currency swap assessments during the crisis. Availability is the first link in this chain,
and the natural first question an individual would ask when confronted with a situation
demanding mass global liquidity provision; “what would a central bank that most needs and
would most effectively use a currency swap look like?” This demands the development of a
prototype by the assessor, namely a model foreign central bank against which to compare the
various candidates for swaps. In the absence of an internationally agreed-upon ‘gold standard’
for central banking procedures (and the likely departure of a model prototype from these
standards if they existed), it is likely that this comparison would be made against the Federal
Reserve’s own characteristics. Indeed, social psychology experiments have demonstrated the role
and frequency of egocentric availability biases, especially in the context of group assessments
and interaction recall (Ross and Sicoly, 1979). Individuals are frequently found to use their own
characteristics as relative norms in the absence of comparative criteria (Dunning and Hayes,
1996), as indicators of the prevalence of certain attributes in a population at large (Krueger and
Clement, 1994), and even to define positive traits and abilities along dimensions where they
excel (Dunning and Cohen, 1992). Broadly, this suggests that individuals making comparisons in
cases of uncertainty will often use themselves as models.
The second link in this explanatory chain involves the representativeness bias. In
assessing various potential swap recipients, FOMC members would ask “how likely is it that this
central bank needs and will effectively use a currency swap?” As a direct corollary of the first
cognitive response, FOMC members implicitly ask themselves how distant any given central
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bank is from the characteristics of its own institution which it finds relevant for the management
of a currency swap. These two heuristics have well-established, and often overlapping sets of
biases resulting from their use in estimating likelihoods: insensitivity to existing prior
probabilities, over- or under-estimation of likelihoods based on the imaginative range of the
assessor, and the illusion of high validity in final choice (Tversky and Kahneman, 1975). These
biases all suggest that human decision-making under uncertainty, even that of financial policy
elites, has socially-influenced error. In the context of FOMC members assessing the probability
of a swap meeting its intended goal, these heuristics suggest a decision based on how closely a
foreign central bank resembles a sound institution for financial regulation and stability, or more
simply, the Federal Reserve.
This theory serves two interrelated purposes. The first is the establishment of a socially
influenced cognitive foundation for decision-making during crisis, which serves to account for
error which would go missed by pure cost-benefit models. The second purpose is to demonstrate
the confound posed by earlier findings regarding this question. We should not expect the role of
social similarity in the assessment of institutional soundness to be limited to central bankers’
decisions. Rather, this phenomenon should more broadly explain minimally some variance in a
broad variety of international economic interactions, especially those involving risk, like trade
and financial investment. In this way, this theory serves to undermine the causal link identified
between US bank exposure in foreign countries and the likelihood of their receiving a currency
swap, simply by dint of explaining some of the variance in the exposure at all. Earlier
explanations of currency swaps as a factor of US investments are correct, but in a limited way;
social similarity of foreign banking systems and their administrators serves as an indicator of
their trustworthiness in the context of a risky decision. In this logic, US bank exposure abroad is
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a simultaneous consequence of the same phenomenon which should affect the likelihood of
currency swap, thereby offering statistically significant results as a factor of their shared causal
precedents. Below, I formalize this theory in the form of three hypotheses with falsifiable claims
about the proposed relationship.
B. Hypotheses
This paper enunciates a theory of social similarity regarding the determinants of currency
swap recipients during the 2008 crisis. Testing such a theory requires grounding, substantively,
what constitutes social similarity. As discussed at length below, literature in the field of elite
communities and global policy coordination suggests that three dimensions of social similarity
are especially consequential: speeches, institutional frameworks, and professional backgrounds.
As such, the three hypotheses to be tested are listed more explicitly below:
H1: Similarity of foreign central bankers’ speeches to those of FOMC members is positively
associated with likelihood for currency swap receipt.
H2: Similarity of foreign central banks’ institutional framework to that of the Federal
Reserve is positively associated with likelihood for currency swap receipt.
H3: Proximity of foreign central bankers to members of the FOMC in a network of global
employment is positively associated with likelihood for currency swap receipt.
To test these claims, I employ a multiple logistic regression model predicting a currency
swap with matched cases using variables relevant to each dimension of social similarity. This
study does not test the role of social similarity in the volume of swap received, especially as this
is a function of the mass of the receiving economy. Rather, these explanatory variables are used
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to predict the binary receipt of a swap at all, which helps to understand their role in the broader
likelihood of choice.
The measures for these types of social similarity are all constructed as a function of
existing data on the actions and characteristics of these institutions and their respective
administrators. These variables are discussed at length in the section below, regarding their
choice, source, measurement units, and interpretation, following the sampling process used to
identify potential counterfactuals.
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CHAPTER 4
DATA AND CASES
A. Matching Counterfactual Recipient States
Not all countries received a currency swap line during the crisis, nor were all countries
necessarily eligible for or in need of one. Indeed, it would serve to overestimate the
competitiveness and underestimate the likelihood of swap receipt if its probability were assumed
to be evenly distributed across all states in 2007 and 2008. In reality, only a select group of
countries was considered for a swap line: those which were deemed by the FOMC to need one.
For this reason, in testing a social theory of swap line decision-making, it is essential to establish
a population of reasonable counterfactual cases against which to compare the actual swap
recipients. A country could be similar to the US in every way, but if its economy was not
meaningfully affected by the crisis it would be foolish to include them in this model. I render this
logic more visually explicit in figure 1 below. Because representatives of the Federal Reserve
informed me that a list of all states under consideration for these swaps is unequivocally
unavailable, I use matching to generate a population of counterfactual states against which to
compare swap recipients along social dimensions.
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Figure 1: Case Selection Logic

The project makes use World Bank macroeconomic data and data from Daniel
McDowell’s work on bilateral central bank swap line development to match countries on the
explicit decision criteria enunciated by the Federal Open Market Commission members, namely
the mass of the economy, depth of the crisis domestically, and the availability of alternative
liquidity lines (“Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee”, 2008). The proxy variables
used to measure these decision criteria for matching are listed below in table 1:
Table 1: Variables for Matching
Decision Criterion
Size of economy

Depth of crisis

Availability of alternative lines

Data Used for Matching
GDP
[World Bank, 2016]
Change in GDP
Bank liquidity to reserve ratio
Real interest rate
[World Bank, 2016]
Domestic credit to private sector
Domestic credit provided by financial sector
2007/8 network of swap lines
[McDowell, 2016]

The matching process involved several important decisions in the data preparation.
Because missing values needed to be imputed for matching, I chose no variables which were
missing more than 50% of their values for all states in 2007. Furthermore, not all actors who
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received swap lines were comparable in scale; most were single central banks, but one was the
European Central Bank, which has constituent member central banks. This was the only
‘umbrella’ central bank to receive a line, so I chose to include the state-level data of all
constituent members rather than the aggregate data for the Eurozone. Finally, there were 2 states
(Brazil and South Korea) which received multiple lines, one of which came from the US in each
case. Because all other states which received alternative lines did not receive one from the US,
and because these two states received alternate lines from distinct countries (China and
Argentina), I decided it was viable to include them in the analysis. These decisions left 30
individual states receiving lines, 16 of which were ECB members and 14 of which received their
swap lines independently. These were coded to be distinguished during the analysis.
I used these data in a propensity score matching algorithm with the ‘MatchIt’ package in
R. This method seeks pairs of states with the lowest dyadic difference in matched propensity
scores from a specified regression model (Ho et al, 2011). In this case, I used a logit model with
the earlier variables after imputing their missing values with the ‘Mice’ package, involving an
estimation of missing variable observations based on values observed in similar units (van
Buuren and Groothuis-Oudshoorn, 2011). I included binary indicators for each variable, which
were coded 1 if an observation was missing that variable’s data before imputation. This logit
model had good fit, with a Hoslem test p-value of 0.695. As there are a variety of choices
available for the method of matching with this package, I chose ‘optimal’ because of its ability to
handle instances with few control cases for each treatment case (in this case, there was a ratio of
about 1:4 respectively) (Ho et al, 2011).
Finally, I had to choose a ratio, or the number of matches per treatment state. This had a
strict upper bound of 4. I did this by iteratively generating matches for all ratio values of 1:4, and
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testing the statistical significance of the difference in the populations’ propensity scores in the
same model, the results of which are shown in table 2. Given the results, I chose to have 2
matches for each treatment state. This is because it is the highest value with an average matched
propensity score above 0.3, and because of the significance of the difference between the two
scores. Finally, this was chosen in part for both the convenience and reasonableness of the
counterfactual population size. Figure 2 displays the distribution of propensity scores with the
ratio of 2 across units.
Table 2: Case Matching Propensity Score Comparisons
Match P-Value of Difference in Matched Average Propensity Score Average Propensity
Ratio of Unmatched to
Count & Unmatched Propensity Scores of Treated & Matched Score of Unmatched Matched & Treated Means

0
1
2
3
4

> 0.000
> 0.000
> 0.000
> 0.000
> 0.000

0.656
0.496
0.333
0.250
0.200

0.066
0.002
> 0.000
> 0.000
> 0.000

0.101
0.004
0.001
0.001
> 0.000

The results yielded 90 countries, 30 of which received currency swap lines and 60 of
which were similar in the dimensions stated by the Federal Reserve as relevant. These 60
matched countries serve as the counterfactual recipient states in this project, and are those which
I will include in my models to test the stated hypotheses about social similarity.
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Figure 2: Case Matching Propensity Score Distribution

B. Governors’ Speeches
The choice of speech similarity is grounded in work by international political economists
who focus on the relationships between central bankers, and between the Federal Reserve and
other central banks specifically. Work on central bank communications has shown the significant
consequences they have for financial markets (Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2005; Hüning, 2016)
and that strategies of central bankers’ speeches have different outcomes in the development of
policy both domestically and internationally (Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2007; Amaya and Filbien,
2015). The semantic influence of central bankers’ speeches on global markets demonstrates its
unique power within international political economy, rendering it an intuitive potential
explanatory variable.
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Alongside the economic effects, linguistic anthropology has shown that similarity in
speech constitutes a community among its members, in which social norms and mores are
developed and respected (Gumperz and Levinson, 1996). As shown above, global policy regimes
are both reflected and actualized through patterns of rhetorical similarity across central bankers
and other relevant actors. Surprisingly, nearly all studies measuring central bankers’ speeches
and their similarity operationalize these values only as dependent variables, and rarely consider
them as theoretically relevant predictors of social phenomena. This study does the opposite,
using semantic similarity as an indicator of social similarity hypothesized to have influenced the
currency swap selection process.
A necessary first step in measuring rhetorical similarity is the identification of the
population of relevant speech-material. The Bank for International Settlements hosts a repository
of foreign central bankers’ speeches, which is publicly available on their website. After
contacting the BIS about the criteria for publishing speeches, a representative responded with the
following:
“The central bankers’ speeches can either be brought to the attention of the BIS by the
different central banks, or collected by BIS staff from the central banks’ websites. In the
latter case, BIS staff use a tool which was developed in-house to scan the different central
banks website. Unfortunately, the tool is not 100% reliable, so it is possible that some
speeches are missed, but we do not have an estimate of the number of missing speeches.
Also, the BIS only publishes speeches that are already made available by the central
banks in English, which implies that (i) some speeches might not be published on the BIS
website because they are not available in English, and (ii) any translation is provided by
the central banks.
17

Furthermore, we apply some other criteria when selecting speeches. These are that:
•

the subject of the speech is of interest to the international central banking
community. For example, if it's a very domestically-oriented speech that would
only mean something to citizens of one particular country, we would not take it;

•

the speech has been given by a senior central banker;

•

it has been given recently; ideally within the last two weeks.” (Canelli, 2016)

While the missingness of some speeches can be seen as an inhibiting factor, the selection
criteria of the BIS can be used as analytical leverage in this project in a few ways. First, the
delimitation of subject importance in speeches is relevant to the kinds of speeches which the
Federal Reserve would both review and deem consequential. The information acquisition
resources of the Federal Reserve, while immense, are not infinite, and only substantively relevant
speech material is likely to be relevant for their assessments of rhetorical similarity. Furthermore,
the delimitation to English or English-translated speeches is also conducive to the social
similarity dimension used in this paper, namely through the provision of an additional step in the
data-generating process wherein central banks have the ability to more carefully and accurately
emulate the rhetorical patterns of the FOMC.
In systematically measuring the semantic similarity of these speeches, I chose to use the
‘textreuse’ package in R for its flexibility and ability to handle large corpora. I chose two
extremes of its many options for corpus similarity. One is a proportion of shared terms used in a
corpus after it’s been cleaned of common terms (Mullen, 2015). This serves as a blunt instrument
of rhetorical similarity in a simple proportion of shared meaningful terms when central bankers
give speeches. The other is the Smith-Waterman algorithm, which generates dyadic scores
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between corpora (speeches) based on their sharing complex strings of terms (Mullen, 2015). This
has been used to measure the degree of bill recycling across US state legislatures (Linder et al,
2016), and in this context serves to capture a more nuanced aspect of rhetorical similarity. These
two measures capture very different aspects of speech similarity, and allow me to measure both
the simple semantic similarity of any central bankers’ speech to those of the FOMC, but also to
test for instances of mimicry which could signal adherence to the US’ financial regulatory
regime.
For the simple similarity measure, I calculated the proportion of shared terms across all
speeches for each country with the US, for each year between the earliest available and 2008.
Importantly, this involved the inclusion of all speeches within a year, rather than the calculation
of a score for each pair of speeches. This measure, bound between 0 and 100, reflects the simple
similarity of vocabulary employed by central bankers in their descriptions of modern economic
issues and their proposed resolutions. Specifically, it is the maximum similarity score between a
state and the US in any of the five years preceding the crisis. Across the dataset of swap
recipients and matched counterfactuals, the average score was 23.48 with a standard deviation of
26.81.
The Smith-Waterman algorithm required a more complex series of measurement
decisions, especially because of the sensitivity of the output score to the parameters used to
estimate it. Specifically, the algorithm identifies the optimal string match between documents
based on the frequency of matching, mismatching, and missing terms between the two
documents, which are weighted by scalar values provided by the researcher. In the absence of a
methodologically or theoretically informed norm for this process (Linder et al, 2016), I opted to
estimate scores for each speech dyad across a variety of parameters. Because the text processing
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eliminates common English terms, I weigh the penalty imposed on gaps and mismatches in a
given string equally, and thereby ‘tune’ the algorithm by changing the magnitude of the match
reward relative to these, fixed at 1.
For each year in which there was speech data for a country, every possible pair of its
speeches with those of the US in the same year were compared with this algorithm, cycling
between match reward values of 1 and 5. These scores, after being averaged across all document
dyads within each year, were transformed from their raw values to their proportion of the
maximum possible score (which would be perfect speech identicality). The final measure used in
the regression models reflects the maximum score proportion for all states in the five years
preceding the crisis. Bound between 0 and 1, the mean value of this variable across observations
was 0.002, with a standard deviation of 0.003.
C. Governors’ Backgrounds
The importance of shared professional backgrounds among financial elites is a longstanding social scientific finding, and is especially central in literature on the revolving door and
regulatory capture. Measured in a broad variety of ways, shared backgrounds of elites has been
associated with collusion between elites, both within and between regulatory bodies, and
between the public and private sectors (Seabrooke and Tsingou, 2009; Baker, 2010; Young,
2012; Selmier, 2013). Recent work has extended this logic to a relational framework with the
logic of social network analysis, such as Young et al’s findings on the relationship between
firms’ network distance to regulators and the frequency of their advocacy (2017). I apply this
logic to central bankers’ relationships to understand its role in swap line agreements. I argue that
the similarity of professional and educational backgrounds of foreign central bank members to
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those of the Federal Open Market Commission members is consequential for the likelihood of
that individual’s central bank to receive a swap line.
To measure this, I make use of the BoardEx dataset, which is an atlas of global
employment history of individuals, including educational backgrounds and other professional
activities. This dataset includes both public and private organizations, which includes central
banks of various countries. The data include both the employment history of individuals, as well
as the years in which that employment was active, allowing for the construction of a firm-to-firm
social network, with weights proportional to the magnitude of shared employee-years. I follow
the approach employed by Young, Marple and Heilman, whereby these data are used to construct
a network of inter-firm connections (2017). This first involved the construction of a bimodal
network of connections between individuals and organizations, which was subsequently
‘collapsed’ on individuals to constitute ties between organizations premised on their shared
individuals. Figure 3 shows this network for all connections between organizations in the subnetwork containing central banks for the 5 years preceding the crisis, with red nodes indicating
collapsed Fed branches, green nodes indicating other central banks, and blue nodes indicating all
other organizations.
This dataset has two important caveats worth acknowledging. First, there is clear regional
bias of employment history focused strongly on Western states. Much like the missingness of
speeches, this can be considered as an advantage. Western states conduct the overwhelming
majority of financial business (Porter and Williams, 2016), meaning that one should expect the
regional bias to be in part due to the uneven distribution of banking density. Furthermore,
because the final regression models omit all states in the ECB and other regional central banks
for their qualitatively different natures (Broz, 2015), their missing scores are moot. Finally, two
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swap recipients were also missing from the dataset, adding an extra empirical hurdle to statistical
support for this hypothesis with these data.
The second caveat is significantly more severe, but has an established solution. Big data
are rife with errors, and BoardEx is no exception. There are many instances of artificially distinct
firms in these data, such as the appearance of McDonald’s, McDonald’s Restaurants, and
McDonald’s Inc. While anyone could logically conclude that these are the same firm, computers
do not have this common sense. This problem is not apparent in instances of central banks, but
duplicity of actually singular firms could exaggerate the distance between one central bank and
another in the broader network. To handle this, I apply the entity resolution algorithms outlined
by Marple et al, which broadly manipulate the nature of connections between firms to reduce the
instances of artificially distinctions (forthcoming). These techniques have demonstrable effects
on the network, especially the topological measures involving distances between firms, which
improve the reliability of any firm-to-firm distance calculation significantly (Marple et al,
forthcoming).
Figure 3: Network of Central Bank Connections by Background
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After applying these resolution techniques, I further replicated Young et al’s approach
through the log-transformation of edge weights, forcing the distance algorithm to choose paths
with the largest number of shared employees, and simultaneously handling the power-law
distribution of edge weights in a more linear fashion (2017). This allowed for a neater calculation
of distances between any two organizations in the network, offering scores for all cases’ central
banks which were in the dataset, and a score of infinity for those banks which were not. Finally, I
calculate proximity as a function of distance, specifically by subtracting the normalized distance
scores from 1. To account for firms not included in the network, I again use Young et al’s
strategy, whereby their distance is considered to be the highest integer not included in the
distribution of distances for observed firms (Young et al, 2017).
This yielded a score for all countries’ central banks which ranged from 0 to 1, with 1
reserved solely for the Federal Reserve itself (perfect proximity) and 0 for central banks which
were not in the dataset (maximal distance). The final score included in the regression models is
the maximum proximity of each central bank to any of the Federal Reserve branches in the five
years preceding the crisis, allowing only for the influence of fresh relationships which should not
be expected to have deteriorated significantly by 2008 . The average proximity score in this
distribution for all case states is 0.437, with a standard deviation of 0.379.
D. Institutional Framework
During their deliberations, the Federal Reserve alluded to the importance of central
banks’ pursuit of ‘prudent policies’ in deciding whether they should receive a line (“Minutes of
the Federal Open Market Committee”, 2008). While policy prudence is in part a factor of the
individuals who make them, the agenda of feasible policies is set by the allowances of
institutional arrangements among individual central banks. For example, work on institutional
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design of central banks shows that the legal institutional arrangements of a bank affect anything
from its stability and success (Barth et al, 2001) to its unique policies, like inflation targeting
(Dittmar et al, 1999) and crisis management (Davies and Green, 2010). For this reason, we
should expect policy maneuvering by foreign central bankers to be significantly affected by the
context in which they work, and subsequently that the Federal Reserve would strongly weigh the
variation on this dimension. This notion is corroborated by the independent insignificance of US
bank exposure in Broz’s regression models when central bank independence scores are included.
I measure institutional similarity using the World Bank banking regulation and
supervision survey (Cihak et al, 2012). This survey includes a broad battery of questions on
banking regulation within an economy, ranging from the rules governing entry into banking, to
the enforcement quality of various banking regulations. One section is of particular importance
for this study, namely the questions on the survey relating to supervision of the banking sector.
This includes questions such as what kind of entity supervises banks, the count thereof, their
responsiveness to the executive, legislature, and their liability for damages to banks incurred by
regulation, among others. In total, 18 relevant binary indicators were chosen from the 41 possible
responses in this section, either through the reduction of mutually exclusive responses or the
omission of questions for which the US offered no response . The responses to these questions
were recoded from text to binary indicators; 1 for yes, -1 for no, and 0 for a non-response. The
survey includes 173 countries, and of the 90 treated and matched case states, 30 were not
included in the survey and had 0 values for all questions.
These binary indicators had clearly identifiable subjects, each with a different number of
responses. To account for the absolute correlations between these responses, which ranged from
0.00 to 0.84, they were reduced using factor analysis. Exploratory principal component analysis
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revealed that 5 factors were both statistically sufficient (final principal component with SD > 1)
and qualitatively logical, which was confirmed with the loadings for the 5-factor model (TuckerLewis factoring reliability = 0.813). Tables 3 and 4 below displays the factor correlation matrix
and loadings.
Table 3: Factor Loading Correlation Matrix

Factor 1
Factor 2
Factor 3
Factor 4
Factor 5

Factor 1
1.00
-0.25
-0.11
-0.19
0.22

Factor 2
-0.25
1.00
0.08
0.19
-0.07

Factor 3
-0.11
0.08
1.00
-0.02
0.23

Factor 4
-0.19
0.19
-0.02
1.00
-0.15

Factor 5
0.22
-0.07
0.23
-0.15
1.00

Table 4: Factor Loadings
Binary Indicator
Simple Majority Legislat. Appoints Head
Simple Majority Legislat. Removes Head

Factor 1
1.006
0.810

Supervisor Responsible to Legislature
Adopted Basel Standards

0.460

Factor 2

Factor 3

Factor 4

Factor 5

0.597

Mandatory Infraction Reporting
Multiple Superintendents Supervising

0.536
-0.489

Cabinet Removes Head

-0.567

Super-Majority Legislat. Removes Head
Prime Minister Removes Head

-0.608
0.904

Prime Minister Appoints Head
Mandatory Infraction Repercussions

0.880
0.569

Head Has Power to Forgive Infractions
Central Bank Supervises Banks

0.464
0.392

Head Has Fixed Term

0.343

Multiple Finance Supervisor
Single Finance Supervisor

-0.465
-0.621

Responsible for Good-Faith Mistakes
Responsible for Damages

0.679
0.618
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The reduction of these questions to factors allowed for two final manipulations, both of
which are included in the final regression model. The first is the most straight-forward use of
factor scores, namely the creation of an index through simple summation of their values. After
the summation of the factor scores, the final scores were normalized by the US’ score on the
factor index and subtracted from 1. In this way, they represent the relative variance of the factor
index score for any country’s central bank, including those which had no responses, from the
responses of the Fed. Across all cases, the mean was 4.097 with a standard deviation of 2.126,
ranging from 0 to 9.886.
The second manipulation makes use of cosine similarity, which involves calculating the
angle between the multidimensional vectors constituted by these scores. This represents an
importantly different understanding of these scores from the simple summation index, namely
through the gradated measurement of parallel or orthogonal responses in the 5-dimensional space
constituted by these scores. While the factor sum accounts solely for the varying weights of the
responses to these questions as assigned by factor analysis, cosine similarity accounts for both
the directionality and magnitude of these score vectors as they differ from the Fed’s. This score
is bound between -1 and 1, with 0 representing perfect identicality, and -1 and 1 representing
different poles of perfect orthogonality. The mean score across all cases was -0.497, with a
standard deviation of 0.339 .
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CHAPTER 5
RESULTS
To test these hypotheses, I constructed a linear model predicting a currency swap from
the Federal Reserve with a battery of variables relevant to each claim, and a final model
including them all. The models presented in table 5 include only the significant variables after
various exploratory models which demonstrated their robustness alongside such measures as
capital account openness and GDP growth rate. These models are only run for non-ECB states
which were not members of broader regional central banks, which were 48 of the 90 cases states.
This reduction added a second level of filtering to establish an appropriate population of
potential recipients, amongst whom this relationship is meant to be tested . The probit regression
results offer support for the first and third hypotheses, and indirect support for the second. Table
5 displays the significance of each variable set, first by hypothesis and finally together with
pseudo-R2 figures for comparison with Broz’s model. Figure 4 shows marginal effects with 95%
confidence intervals, also reported in the results.
A first note is that only one variable defies expectations. Term similarity holds a negative
independent effect on the likelihood of swap receipt, despite contrary predictions. This measure
is specifically the average proportion of total terms shared across all speeches in the five years
preceding the crisis, ranging from 0 to 100 for interpretation. A separate regression shows that
term similarity is positively associated with swap likelihood on its own, which suggests its
negative direction is a result of its interaction with the Smith-Waterman scores. This has some
logic to it; higher proportion of shared terms without an increase in the length of shared string
content should represent misalignment on substantive policy areas with the US, thereby
diminishing the likelihood of a swap. Outside of this variable, all others demonstrate a positive
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relationship between social similarity to the Federal Reserve and the likelihood of receiving a
currency swap.
The single strongest predictor of swap receipt is a foreign central bank’s independence,
using the CBI dataset (Garriga, 2016). This variable, measured as the proportional difference
from the US’ score in 2007, is robust to all other measures included for the various hypotheses
and controls. This variable ranges from -0.4 to 0.4, meaning that the country with the highest
CBI score had between 1.28 and 2.82 times greater likelihood of receiving a swap line from the
US than the country with the lowest score. This offers important support for the notion that the
US strongly preferred independent central banks to manage the currency swaps it was issuing.
This inclination toward independent central banks is a strong first indicator of the Fed’s
preference for social similarity, comporting with its long history of operating largely
independently of Congress. Despite the dearth of significance for either of the institutional
factor measures, their negative direction alongside the positive effect of CBI scores can be
interpreted as partial support for the second hypothesis .
The next strongest predictor of a currency swap during this period was the similarity of
foreign central bankers’ speeches. As discussed, the negative term similarity is understandable as
an independent effect alongside the strong, positive effect of Smith-Waterman similarity. This
finding is robust to the inclusion of a variety of other economic indicators, including GDP
growth, and is largely independent of the BoardEx network proximity (correlation = 0.31). This
variable’s range is bound from 0 to 1 , so these results show that a 0.01% increase in similarity
score with the US, as a proportion of the maximum possible score, is independently associated
with a 1.18 to 2.45 times greater likelihood of receiving a swap line. This offers strong support
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for the first hypothesis, and demonstrates nuance in the kinds of speech signaling rewarded by
the Fed.
Finally, the proximity of foreign central bankers to members of the FOMC is strongly
and positively associated with the likelihood of a currency swap. This variable is again bound
between 0 and 1, with the score of 0 reserved for states not in the employment network, and the
score of 1 only available to the Federal Reserve itself. By this logic, the central bank closest to
the Fed in this network had between 1.04 and 1.91 times higher likelihood of receiving a
currency swap line than the farthest bank in the network, independent of all other factors.
Despite the relatively marginal substantive effects at the lower bound of this confidence interval,
this finding is both robust to a host of other economic factors, and strongly supportive of the
third hypothesis. These results suggest that well-connected central bankers were far betterequipped to solicit a currency swap during the crisis than central bankers who had little
professional overlap with FOMC members.
Collectively, these results demonstrate strong support for the broader theory articulated
here, namely that dimensions of social similarity played a significant role in the selection of
recipients for currency swaps during the 2008 crisis. These results show stronger promise than
those relying solely on economic indicators, with pseudo-R2 values up to twice those of earlier
predictive models. The final model includes a greater number of states with stronger theoretical
justification for their inclusion, and its findings are robust to the inclusion of the primary
explanatory variables of earlier studies . The model validates claims made by the FOMC that
states with greater economic mass were more strongly considered, a corroboration of Broz’s
earlier findings. With every ten-fold increase in GDP, a country is estimated to be 1.006 and
1.119 times likelier to have received a currency swap from the Federal Reserve. Its continued
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robustness across models is interesting when juxtaposed against its subordinate significance to
that of speech similarity and CBI, lending further credence to the claim that social similarity
played a comparable or stronger role in this decision process than economic indicators alone.

Table 5: Regression Results
Dependent variable: Currency Swap
Speeches Institutional Backgrounds

All

5yr Max. Term Similarity

-0.003
(0.002)

-0.004*
(0.002)

5yr Max. S.W. Similarity

0.503**
(0.188)

0.533***
(0.186)

Factor Cosine Similarity

-0.078
(0.190)

-0.145
(0.174)

Factor Index Sum

-0.019
(0.027)

-0.017
(0.024)

5yr Max. Proximity

0.319*
(0.163)

0.340**
(0.156)

'07 CBI Weighted Diff.

0.597***
(0.202)

0.590***
(0.217)

0.666***
(0.205)

0.642***
(0.202)

Log GDP

0.100***
(0.020)

0.119***
(0.019)

0.082***
(0.027)

0.059**
(0.027)

Constant

-2.332*** -2.717***
(0.485)
(0.486)

-1.998***
(0.603)

-1.485**
(0.603)

48
0.628
-8.625
25.250

48
0.695
-3.842
23.685

Observations
48
Max. Likelihood Pseudo-R2 0.653
Log Likelihood
-6.953
Akaike Inf. Crit.
23.907

48
0.600
-10.359
30.718
*

p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note:
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Figure 4: Marginal Effects on Log-Odds of Currency Swap Receipt
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CHAPTER 6
DISCUSSION
These results offer strong support for the theory proposed here, that social similarity held
a significant influence on the likelihood of a state to receive a swap. Among the states which
would be reasonably considered for a swap, delimited through matching on explicit selection
criteria and filtering qualitatively illogical cases, the similarity of speeches, professional
backgrounds, and institutional factors all held significant effects on swap likelihood in the
expected direction. While the measure constructed for institutional similarity held no significant
effects, the coefficients were in the expected direction, and another measure of institutional
similarity to the US proved to be the strongest indicator of swap receipt. Furthermore, these
variables were robust to a host of traditional economic indicators such as GDP (net and growth
rate), and US trade share and bank exposure, which have been used to explain this phenomenon.
The regression models presented suggest that social similarity strongly affected a central bank’s
chances at receiving a currency swap during the financial crisis, and that it holds superior
explanatory power to sheer economic indicators alone.
Another finding of interest is crucial for supporting an earlier claim made about this
theory, namely that US bank exposure and trade may be simultaneous byproducts of the same
influence as that affecting swap receipt. On top of the insignificance of US bank exposure and
trade share alongside the measures for social similarity constructed here in predicting swap
receipt, two basic OLS models show that both of these variables are strongly and positively
associated with measures of social similarity. These results even vary logically, with
professional backgrounds of central bankers exhibiting stronger influence on bank exposure, and
speech similarity and CBI affecting trade more strongly. Taken together, these results offer
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strong support for the claim that social similarity drives estimates of foreign institutions’
trustworthiness, thereby simultaneously affecting both decisions such as trade and investment, as
well as elite decisions like emergency currency swaps. Social similarity may come to be shown
as a confound to a broader variety of international economic predictive models, and future work
should take its role more seriously under such circumstances.
There are several political consequences of these findings. First, cognitive models of
decision-making under uncertainty apply even to the loftiest political and economic elites, and
theories which attempt to explain their behavior on the international stage should consider social
psychological foundations more strongly. As a corollary, we should not expect this to be an
isolated circumstance of socially homophilous tendencies, rather an expression of basic human
tendencies, the amplitude of which is proportional to situational uncertainty. The selection of
currency swap recipients offers a unique window into the decision-making by the Fed under
circumstances which allow minimal time for the preparation of thorough dossiers which typically
accompany the redistribution of billions of dollars. In lieu of more informed cost-benefit
analyses, members of the FOMC appear to have relied on basic social heuristics in identifying
qualified recipients, a factor of the uncertainty they faced. Absent an institutionalized mechanism
to handle this, we should expect it with the next crisis.
Economically, these results appear to have graver consequences. If this behavior is
indicative of broader trends in the distributive decisions of global financial policy elites, then a
continued insulation of wealth from the global south should be expected. Even if this behavior is
isolated to crises of the sort which occurred in 2008, this trend suggests that the distribution of
much-needed resources during a global banking epidemic could spell the doom of nations who
don’t quite look like the hardly-diverse Federal Reserve (Klein, 2016). These tendencies impede
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progress toward a more equitably distributive global economy, and therefore demand some
institutionalized mitigation system to preclude unnecessary suffering which would result in those
dissimilar states.
Such a mechanism would require some enforcement over the Federal Reserve, which is
domestically unlikely but could be pursued through proposals in negotiations like the Basel
Accords. An example of such a mechanism could resemble a phone tree for emergencies,
organized hierarchically by connectedness of central banks via existing swap lines. Such a
mechanism would make use of the relational nature of existing dyadic central bank support lines,
which have flourished after the crisis (McDowell, 2016), to ensure the most efficient allocation
of emergency currency for debt repayment during a global crisis. This follows the existing stated
logic of the Fed in their avoidance of states with existing lines, but extends that framework to a
system-level analysis of distances between states that both have and need resources of viable
currency. Absent such a mechanism on the international stage, especially one to which multiple
powerful central banks adhere, we should expect recurrences of these homophilous tendencies
during highly uncertain and consequential distributive situations.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
Friends of the Fed managed to survive the 2008 financial crisis via their preferential
receipt of much-needed currency swaps to pay dollar debt obligations. This paper has
demonstrated that social similarity of central banks along the dimensions of speeches,
professional backgrounds, and institutional contexts were all consequential for a state’s
likelihood of receiving such a swap. These theoretically informed predictors were built from
relevant datasets of central bankers’ speeches, professional and educational histories, and binary
indicators of relevant central bank institutional characteristics. These variables have greater
significance in predicting swap receipt likelihood than economic indicators from earlier models,
such as bank exposure and trade share with the US, and have even been shown to predict those
economic indicators as simultaneous byproducts.
This paper has opened the door to the rigorous quantification of social similarity in the
context of predicting international political economic phenomena, such as swap line receipt
during a crisis. Future work should address some of the inadequacies of the measures generated
here, which were necessary consequences of an exploratory study like this. Specifically, future
studies should disaggregate the nuance of textual signaling within speech in more detailed ways,
such as the employment of relational text analysis to elucidate central banking ideologies (Rolfe
et al, forthcoming). This approach would more closely access the aspect of speech similarity
which this study showed to be consequential, namely the particular constellations of policyrelevant text, rather than simple frequencies of indicative terms or phrases. Furthermore, future
work should improve upon the measures of institutional similarity generated here, especially in
terms of validation against existing measures of institutional characteristics like CBI scores.
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Finally, future work should test the applicability of this model to political economic decisions in
different cultures and times, as well as under varying degrees of risk and uncertainty, to gauge its
generalizability more broadly.
Social similarity is a consequential factor in economically distributive decisions made
under great uncertainty. Cognitive foundations of these heuristics have been demonstrated in a
battery of social psychological experiments and studies, and this paper demonstrates that
financial policy elites are not above the human tendencies which these heuristics embody.
Rather, it appears that members of the FOMC chose institutions which most resemble their own
to receive billions of dollars in what were effectively international bailouts between central
banks. The recognition of the truly social nature of even elite decisions has consequences both
for how we manage our existing international economic order, especially during global crises
like that of 2008, as well as for the construction of a more equitably distributive system as we
deepen our mutual international interdependence.
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APPENDIX I
BROZ REGRESSION MODEL WITH CENTRAL BANK
INDEPENDENCE AND GLOBAL FINANCIAL CENTER
Broz Model Regression Results with and without CBI
Dependent variable:
Currency Swap
Broz Model CBI & GFC
US Bank Exposure

0.004*
(0.002)

0.002
(0.002)

Share Global GDP

-0.736
(1.791)

-0.287
(1.894)

Share Global Liquid Liabilities

1.749
(2.880)

0.923
(4.084)

’07 Share US Trade

3.816
(2.241)

2.874
(2.628)

Inflation

-0.004
(0.004)

-0.003
(0.004)

Reserves IFS

-0.000
(0.000)

-0.000
(0.000)

Dollar Shortage

0.003
(0.002)

0.002
(0.002)

Global Financial Center

0.303
(0.373)

’07 Weighted CBI

-0.457
(0.392)

Constant

0.259**
(0.103)

0.549*
(0.300)

Observations
Max. Likelihood Pseudo-R2
Log Likelihood
Akaike Inf. Crit.

33
0.263
-13.877
43.754

32
0.349
-12.053
44.105

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note:
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APPENDIX II
CENTRAL BANK SURVEY QUESTIONS
a. What body/agency supervises banks?
i. (a) The Central Bank
ii. (b) A Single Bank Supervisory Agency/ Superintendency
iii. (c) Multiple Bank Supervisory Agencies/Superintendencies
b. Is there a single financial supervisory agency for all of the main financial
institutions (insurance companies, contractual savings institutions, savings
banks)?
c. Is there a single financial supervisory agency for all of the activities in which
commercial banks are allowed to do business?
d. To whom are the supervisory bodies responsible or accountable?
i. (a) the Prime Minister
ii. (b) the Finance Minister or other cabinet level official
iii. (c) a legislative body, such as Parliament or Congress
iv. (d) other
e. How is the head of the supervisory agency (and other directors) appointed?
i. (a) the decision of the head of government (e.g. President, Prime Minister)
ii. (b) the decision of the Finance Minister or other cabinet level authority
iii. (c) a simple majority of a legislative body (Parliament or Congress)
iv. d) a supermajority (e.g, 60%, 75%) of a legislative body
v. (e) other
f. Can the head of the supervisory agency can be removed by:
i. (a) the decision of the head of government (e.g. President, Prime
Minister);
ii. (b) the decision of the Finance Minister or other cabinet level authority;
iii. (c) a simple majority of a legislative body (Parliament or Congress);
iv. (d) a supermajority (e.g, 60%, 75%) of a legislative body;
v. (e) other
g. Does the head of the supervisory agency (and other directors) have a fixed term?
h. Is your country planning on adopting Basel II?
i. If an infraction of any prudential regulation is found in the course of supervision,
must it be reported?
j. Are there mandatory actions that the supervisor must take in these cases?
k. Can individual supervisory staff be held personally liable for damages to a bank
caused by their actions or omissions committed in the good faith exercise of their
duties?
l. Can the supervisory agency be held liable for damages to a bank caused by its
actions?
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APPENDIX III
REGRESSION MODEL INCLUDING US BANK EXPOSURE AND TRADE

Dependent variable: Currency Swap
Full Model & Exposure
US Bank Exposure

0.001
(0.001)

US Trade Share

-0.138
(1.998)
-0.004*

5yr Max. Term Similarity

(0.002)
0.490**

5yr Max. S.W. Similarity

(0.218)
Factor Cosine Similarity

-0.136
(0.248)

Factor Index Sum

-0.024
(0.031)

5yr Max. Log Weighted Proximity

0.463**
(0.207)

’07 CBI Weighted Diff.

0.662**
(0.279)

Log GDP

0.043
(0.036)

Constant

-1.095
(0.832)

Observations
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Max. Likelihood Pseudo-R2
Log Likelihood

0.815
-2.866

Akaike Inf. Crit.

25.731
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note:
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APPENDIX IV
REGRESSION MODELS DEMONSTRATING SOCIAL SIMILARITY
EFFECT ON BANK EXPOSURE AND TRADE

Dependent variables:
US Bank Exposure US Trade Share ‘07
(1)
(2)
5yr Max. Term Similarity

-0.012
(0.303)

-0.0002
(0.0001)

5yr Max. S.W. Similarity

24.755
(27.579)

0.044***
(0.014)

Factor Cosine Similarity

-5.856
(30.322)

-0.010
(0.014)

Factor Index Sum

-2.369
(4.232)

-0.001
(0.002)

5yr Max. Log Weighted Proximity

47.779**
(18.971)

0.020**
(0.009)

’07 CBI Weighted Diff.

55.134
(33.078)

0.034**
(0.015)

Constant

-12.083
(20.924)

-0.012
(0.009)

Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error
F Statistic

55
59
0.202
0.318
0.103
0.240
46.535 (df = 48)
0.023 (df = 52)
*
2.031 (df = 6; 48) 4.049*** (df = 6; 52)
*

p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note:
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